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As news about hostile takeovers hits the 
headlines and not just the business pages, 
names like Boone Pickens, Carl Icahn and 
Ivan Boesky have become far better known 
than the CEOs of General Electric, General 
Motors, General Foods, General Mills or any 
other general. Takeovers have also developed 
a colorful vocabulary of their own-"poison 
pills," "shark repellents," "junk bonds," 
"raiders;' "white knights," "wolf packs," and 
"greenmail:' Beyond the glamour there is a 
genuine public policy debate about takeovers 
that deserves examination and evaluation. 
This report looks at the arguments put forth 
by the "raiders" and "entrenched manage-
ment" and then discusses the potential but 
vital role of a third force in corporate 
takeovers. 
Introduction 
Many members of Congress have become 
concerned over what is viewed as a rising 
trend of hostile mergers. "I think it is time 
for Congress to send a clear signal to corpo-
rate America that we will no longer tolerate 
unrestrained warfare between top manage-
ments for control of corporate assets:' That 
stirring indictment of competition in the 
market for corporate control was stated by 
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Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of 
the House Judiciary Committee. 
In that spirit, in the last session of Con-
gress, more than 50 bills were introduced to 
deal with mergers and acquisitions. Over 
twenty hearings on the subject were held by 
nine different committees. However, no sin-
gle piece of legislation came close to passing. 
If the raiders are opportunists, 
it is boards of directors and 
senior executives who have given them 
the opportunity. 
Opinions vary sharply on many aspects of 
corporate takeovers, and especially those ini-
tiated by shareholders who oppose existing 
managements. Many economists and other 
scholars contend that this process keeps 
executives on their toes and thus enhances 
shareholder value. The executives of these 
same firms, in striking contrast, assert that 
hostile attempts to change corporate control 
reduce business productivity and perform-
ance. They argue that unfriendly tender 
offers divert management attention and cor-
porate resources from the serious business 
of producing and distributing goods and 
services. 
Yet, on reflection, if the raiders are oppor-
tunists, it is boards of directors and senior 
executives who have given them the opportu-
nity. Too many CEOs and boards have 
focused on the ballet and the opera as the 
epitome of a corporation's responsibility to 
society. They seem to forget that a business 
is an economic institution, designed to pro-
vide goods and services for consumers in 
order to benefit the shareholders. 
The irony is that some of the problems of 
the takeover "targets" have arisen from their 
desire to be more socially responsible. The 
modern business literature tells manage-
ment to balance the desires of employees, 
customers, suppliers, public interest groups, 
and shareholders. For example, the Commit-
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tee for Economic Development, in its influen-
tial report on the social responsibility of 
business, states that the professional man-
ager regards himself as a "trustee" balancing 
the interests of many diverse participants 
and constituents in the enterprise. It is inter-
esting to note that shareholders are only 
listed as one among those worthy groups-
and they are listed last. 
The Case for Government Intervention 
Three key arguments are offered by those 
who believe that corporate takeovers are 
harmful and should be regulated more fully 
by the federal government: 
#1. Hostile takeovers are socially and eco-
nomically detrimental. Hostile takeovers are 
viewed as leading to forced liquidations or 
restructuring of viable companies by "raid-
ers" who reap considerable profit. The proc-
ess is supposed to leave the companies in 
weakened and highly leveraged positions. 
The groups initiating hostile takeovers are 
considered to be mere financiers and specu-
lators who are not serious about the opera-
tions of the companies, and who are in it 
solely for quick profits. 
In this view, takeover threats force man-
agers to look to the short term in order to 
keep their current stock price high. This 
diverts attention from longer-term invest-
ment potential and growth. Alfred Chandler, 
Jr., the distinguished business historian of 
the Harvard Business School, worries about 
the rising trend of unfriendly takeovers: 
"How can anyone justify it? It provides no 
productivity, services, or function .... While 
our managers are fighting takeovers, the Jap-
anese are finding it easier to take over their 
markets." 
As investment banker Felix Rohatyn put it, 
"large corporations can be treated like arti-
chokes and simply torn apart without any 
regard for employees, communities, or cus-
tomers, solely in order to pay off speculative 
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debt:' Peter Drucker has echoed this theme: 
The new wave of hostile takeovers has 
already profoundly altered the contours and 
landmarks of the American economy. It has 
become a dominant force ... in the behavior 
and actions of American managements and, 
almost certainly, a major factor in the erosion 
of American competitive and technological 
leadership. 
The standard response of economists is 
that the stock market's valuation of takeover 
efforts is very positive. Numerous studies 
show that the stock of the target goes up 
quickly on the mere announcement of a ten-
der offer, and that of the buyer usually 
moves little at all. 
The common argument offered by econo-
mists who assume that markets are "effi-
cient" is that mergers, even hostile ones, 
provide economic gains in the form of econo-
mies of scale, better management and more 
productive allocation of resources. The very 
threat of a takeover is supposed to discipline 
inefficient management. Redeploying assets 
in restructured companies may cause some 
unemployment and community dislocations, 
but the assets do not disappear from the 
economy. The new investors have a strong 
economic incentive to put them to productive 
use. Thus, hostile takeovers are seen as creat-
ing real value for both bidders' and target 
companies' shareholders. 
Management's rejoinder to the economists 
is that short-term increases in share prices 
are not the appropriate basis for evaluating 
the costs and benefits of takeovers. Nor do 
all economic analyses of stock data support 
the standard view that stockholders of the 
target necessarily benefit from takeovers. A 
study at the University of Maryland of 78 
mergers and takeovers in the period 1976-81 
concluded that three years later the price of 
the acquirers' stock was much lower than if 
it had continued performing as it had before 
the acquisition. 
Takeover opponents also argue that a gain 
in the share value of the merged company 
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does not necessarily prove that expected effi-
ciency increases are responsible. The key fac-
tor may be a reduction in taxes, which 
reflects neither improved efficiency in the 
use of resources nor benefits to the economy. 
It is intriguing to examine what actually 
happens to target firms subsequent to acqui-
sition. In the case of the 25 major acquisi-
tions of 1965, only 13 were still part of the 
acquirers or their successors by early 1986. 
Ten others were divested, one was dissolved, 
and still another is up for sale. To be sure, 
this is a small sample from which to draw 
conclusions, but there seems to be little his-
torical evidence that tenderers have man-
aged the businesses they acquired any more 
profitably than their industry peers. Nor 
does there appear to be much evidence that 
they have achieved significant profitability 
improvements for the firms taken over. 
To sum up the controversy about takeovers, 
the shareholders of the target firm usually 
benefit but those of the raiders rarely do. 
The takeover effort must therefore reflect a 
lack of concern by the raiders with the inter-
ests of their shareholders. 
What then motivates them? There must be 
large "rents" (extraordinary gains) available 
from control and management of large enter-
prises. In order to obtain such special gains, 
the raiders are willing to offer above-market 
prices for the shares of the target company. 
The academic supporters of takeovers look 
down at existing management of target firms 
because of their supposed lack of concern 
for their shareholders. To be consistent, it is 
equally hard to deify the managements of the 
"sharks," who have little more regard for 
their own shareholders. 
#2. Credit markets are negatively affected 
QY "non-Rroductive" merger activity. Speak-
ing for the Federal Reserve System, Board 
Chairman Paul Volcker says, "I ... have con-
cerns about the potential risks associated 
with mergers and takeovers when these 
transactions involve unusual amounts of 
leveraging." After acknowledging that many 
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mergers may have positive social effects, 
Volcker warns that "these potential benefits 
clearly are diminished if the mergers are 
accompanied by more fragile balance sheets 
or more precarious loan portfolios." 
Other critics view takeovers as draining 
resources from longer-term investment and 
growth-enhancing activities. In the event of 
default on "junk" bonds, many financial 
institutions may be adversely affected. 
Takeover activity is also criticized because of 
large "transaction costs" benefiting lawyers, 
investment bankers, accountants, and print-
ing and advertising firms. 
The responses to these arguments take 
many forms. The concern over transaction 
costs is put into perspective; their large abso-
lute size (in millions of dollars) is dwarfed by 
the billions of dollars involved in the financ-
ing process. To the critics of junk bonds, the 
rejoinder is that the risk-reward ratio of 
these securities is in line with the economics 
of the market and basic principles of finan-
cial analysis. One risks more in order to earn 
more. Moreover, the credit is not "used up" 
but recycled in the economy. 
In any event, new bonds issued in exchange 
for stock in target companies came to less 
than 1 percent of new debt in non-financial 
corporations in 1980-83. Credit to finance 
the equity purchases in the largest takeovers 
in 1984 amounted to only 1 to 1.5 percent of 
domestic debt. Moreover, two-thirds of the 
bank loans extended to finance those mer-
gers were repaid by April 1985, the bulk 
within six months. 
#3. Abuses have crept into the takeover 
process. One prominent attorney describes 
the situation as follows: "We have entered 
the era of the two-tier, front-end-loaded, 
bootstrap, bust-up, junk-bond takeover." In 
this view, the free flow of information has 
been impeded and the relative economic 
power of bidders and management has been 
altered. The use of high-yield, low-rated 
"junk" bonds to finance acquisition is one 
such example. 
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Investment bankers note two current prac-
tices that may be considered to be "abuses:· 
One is the ability to commence a takeover 
without having binding financial commit-
ments in place. Such conditional bids have a 
headline-grabbing effect and stampede the 
shares of the company into the hands of arbi-
trageurs and speculators. The second abuse 
involves the tactic of putting a company into 
"play:• Seemingly deliberate leaks drive the 
shares of the company into the hands of 
short-term speculators. 
The proponents of takeover efforts note 
that many other abuses arise from the 
efforts of managements to repel unsolicited 
overtures. They contend that shareholder 
value is reduced when companies adopt "poi-
son pills" and other "shark repellents:· 
Alternate Public Policy Approaches 
Proposed responses to the problems gener-
ated by hostile takeovers range from laissez-
faire to tough new legislation designed to 
"correct" the perceived market failures. 
Here are the five key alternative approaches: 
1. No problem exists, therefore, no "solu-
tion" is necessary. The prevailing academic 
view is that the market for corporate control 
is functioning reasonably well. Given the pas-
sive roles of many boards of directors, hos-
tile takeovers are helpful in keeping 
companies on their toes and in replacing 
inefficient, en trenched managements. If 
there is any role for public policy, it is to pre-
vent management from thwarting the will of 
the shareholders. 
2. There is a problem with regard to hos-
tile takeovers, but it will cure itself. Those in 
this second category believe that the hostile 
takeover phenomenon will cool substantially 
when the next serious recession reduces the 
earnings of the highly leveraged companies. 
Many corporations being restructured to a 
riskier mode as a result of leveraged buy-
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outs may go "belly up." These negative expe-
riences will dampen the ardor of other 
potential hostile suitors and reduce the fund-
ing available to them. 
In this second view, the takeover wave will 
subside as a result of natural causes and 
hence no change in public policy is war-
ranted. 
3. There is a continuing problem, but it can 
be handled with further changes in tax pol-
icy. Because the tax deductibility of interest 
is a key element of most hostile takeovers, 
this group contends that changes need only 
be made in tax provisions favoring debt over 
equity. 
Interest charges are tax deductible while 
dividends are taxed twice, once at the corpo-
rate level and again at the level of the individ-
ual shareholder. Even though the current tax 
reform legislation will remove capital gains 
advantages for equity financing, the reduc-
tion in corporate and individual tax rates 
will reduce tax differentials for debt versus 
equity overall. 
4. The federal government should resort to 
additional regulatory devices. One possibil-
ity is to tighten the criteria for allowable 
investments for life insurance companies 
and pension funds. Some favor the SEC 
investigating trading "abuses," such as 
manipulation of stock prices via false 
rumors, leaks, and other sharp arbitrageur 
practices. 
5. The takeover problem is so serious that 
tough new legislation is required. The aim is 
to make it more difficult for shareholder 
groups to make tender offers that are not 
endorsed by the company's board of direc-
tors. 
Most of the bills introduced in Congress to 
regulate corporate acquisitions are designed 
to protect target companies. For example, 
one bill would give outside directors of a tar-
get company the right to veto a tender offer 
or the acquisition of a controlling interest, 
subject to reversal by a vote of the sharehold-
ers. Another bill would prohibit open market 
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purchases by one corporation of more than 
20 percent of another's stock. Yet another 
legislative proposal would deny successful 
acquirers a tax deduction for interest on 
debt incurred to finance their acquisition. 
Moving across the spectrum of government 
intervention in corporate governance is no 
simple matter. Each of the more activist 
approaches is likely to generate serious and 
often unexpected side effects-the "govern-
ment failure" that so frequently accompa-
nies attempts to deal with "market failure." 
Conclusions 
Contests for control of some large compan-
ies have focused national attention on hostile 
takeovers. Yet these transactions represent 
only a small fraction of the changes in con-
trol of American corporations carried out 
each year. Most takeovers continue to be 
friendly and approved by the boards of both 
companies involved. In many cases, the 
board of the target firm may have required a 
bit of coaxing-such as the threat to "walk 
away" and see the price of the target compa-
ny's stock drop sharply. 
Considerable evidence shows that takeover 
contests are beneficial for stockholders of 
target companies. In this regard, it is intrigu-
ing to note the views of top executives of the 
most successful firms toward their stock-
holders. In one recent study, two faculty 
members of the Harvard Business School 
report that none of the top executives of the 
12 successful American companies they stud-
ied was concerned about the current market 
value of the company's stock. One CEO 
stated this position very clearly: 
The highest priority with me is perpetuation 
of the enterprise. I'd like to leave this joint in 
better shape than when someone passed me the 
baton. I have to take care of the shareholders in 
this, but I don't sweat the shareholders too 
much. Most investors in our industry are 
passive. 
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The two researchers concluded that the 
successful managers were committed "first 
and foremost, to the enhancement of corpo-
rate wealth, which includes not only the 
firm's financial assets reflected on the bal-
ance sheet but also its important human 
assets and its competitive positions in the 
various markets in which it operates." 
Do corporate takeovers promote economic 
efficiency? The great bulk of the academic 
literature states that the answer is yes. Why 
else, the reasoning goes, would share prices 
rise on the mere announcement of a hostile 
takeover effort? 
The cold, hard reality is that there is little 
organized data to affirm or discredit the effi-
ciency hypothesis. It is difficult, however, to 
reconcile that hypothesis with the large num-
ber of "post-merger divorces" -up to 40 per-
cent of the acquisitions of the 1970s. 
One comprehensive study shows that ten-
derers have not managed the businesses they 
acquired any more profitably than their 
industry peers. Nor have they achieved sig-
nificant profitability improvements relative 
to the pre-takeover situation. In addition, the 
Congressional Tax Committee says a large 
portion of the stock price gain is due to capi-
talizing the tax benefits. 
Yet there is no need-or justification-to 
argue that all takeover attempts are benign 
or that every effort to repulse them is laud-
able. Some businesses benefit from new 
management or even the threat of a change 
in management. Some "shark repellents" 
benefit small stockholders by providing bar-
riers to two-tiered tender offers. Reasonable 
amounts of self-interest can be expected on 
the part of both those attempting corporate 
takeovers and those opposing them. 
The most significant factor to take into 
account in evaluating proposals for govern-
ment to "do something" about hostile 
takeovers is historical. The long and intricate 
experiences of government involvement in 
business decision-making are not impressive. 
Study after study shows that government 
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often does more harm than good when it 
interferes in private economic matters. The 
presence of some shortcoming in the private 
sector (often called "market failure") is not 
sufficient cause for government to intervene. 
Much government regulation fails to meet an 
elementary benefit-cost test. 
The heart of a positive response to 
unsolicited takeovers rests with 
the company's own board of directors. 
The balance between management's need 
to act expeditiously in the interest of the cor-
poration and the shareholder's right to call 
that action into account should be resolved 
at the level closest to the problem and the 
relevant facts-by the corporation, its own-
ers, and managers in the first instance; by 
state law, if necessary; and by federal law 
only as a last resort. This does not mean that 
inequities in the battle between management 
and tenderers created by tax biases or exist-
ing regulations should not be addressed. But 
the basic task of insuring that the market for 
corporate control serves investors, employ-
ees and other interested parties ultimately 
lies outside of government. 
The heart of a positive response to unsolic-
ited takeovers is not poison pills or shark 
repellents nor is it government restraints on 
raiders. There is a third and often neglected 
force designed to foster stockholder inter-
ests, the company's own board of directors. 
Under law, all corporate power is exer-
cised by or under the authority of the board. 
Directors must really act as fiduciaries of 
the shareholders. But the complacent or 
rubber-stamp director has not totally van-
ished from the boardroom. Responding more 
fully to the desires of the owners of the busi-
ness is the key to repelling takeover threats. 
Corporate officials, both board members and 
officers, often forget until the company's 
stock is in play that shareholders continually 
vote with their dollars. 
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The most important, and rarely per-
formed, duty of the board is to learn how to 
say no. It is up to the board to veto proposed 
capital investments whose yield is below the 
cost of capital-even if some key executive is 
going to get upset because it was his or her 
pet project. 
The outside directors especially must 
learn to act on the knowledge that the inside 
directors who serve on the board with them 
are occasionally motivated by different con-
cerns. Acquisitions may be good for execu-
tives whose compensation is related to the 
size of the company, but some can be poor 
investments for shareholders. A supergener-
ous corporate donation to the ballet may do 
wonders for the social life of the CEO, but it 
hardly benefits the shareholders. 
The challenge to many boards is to pay out 
more cash for shareholders and to reduce 
outlays for low-yield projects. The record is 
clear: If the board will not make the difficult 
choices that enhance the value of the corpo-
ration, the takeover artists will. Takeover 
mania is not a cause but a symptom of the 
unmet challenge. 
Outside directors are the heart of the criti-
cal third force in contests for corporate con-
trol. They need to bear in mind that the 
future of the corporation is in their hands-
as long as they serve the desires of the share-
holders. 
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